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Abstract: This article focuses on the ‘hidden public culture’ formed by individual memories of 
violent conflicts, with particular reference to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–90). Taking 
 memory as a terrain through which individuals can contest authoritarian governance and 
repressive memory scripts, the article argues that personal memories of ordinary citizens can 
contribute to illuminate the power relations that structure war memorialisations. Through a 
series of interviews, the article analyses militia practices in a small town in North Metn to 
challenge the idea that militias were merely defending a territory from external enemies. Militia 
abuses against the populations they were meant to defend during the Civil War are also used 
as a starting point to reflect on Lebanon’s present. This case study is then used as a starting 
point to advocate for the use of personal memories in the research of violent conflicts as a way 
to broaden our understanding of conflict’s lived experiences.
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‘This is worse than the war’, said Salma, a 72-year-old woman interviewed in North 
Metn.1 She was referring to the massive explosion that devastated Beirut on 4 August 
2020. As a result of the blast, in a few seconds over 200 people were killed, 6,000 
wounded, and 300,000 left homeless or displaced. Pending the results of an investiga-
tion, many in Lebanon blame the negligence and corruption of present and past 
Lebanese governments for the explosion. Almost 1,700 tons of nitrate ammonium 
were stored in the port for over six years, despite the authorities receiving a number of 
warnings as to the potential danger. In the aftermath, Salma and many others who 
like her had lived through Lebanon’s Civil War (1975–90), have relived their experi-
ences of the war’s worst days. The blast has refreshed the trauma of the conflict and 
the following decades of Israeli bombings (in 1993, 1997, and 2006) and targeted 
assassinations (between 2004 and 2013). The conviction that the war never actually 
ended—despite the official cessation of hostilities in 1990—persists among the 
Lebanese. The idea is reinforced by ongoing political violence and by the fact that the 
warlords of yesteryear—protected by years of impunity—still monopolise both power 
and the official memory of the conflict.
Given this premise, this article contends that the ‘hidden public culture’ formed by 
the memories of ordinary individuals can play a crucial role in our understanding of 
Lebanon’s past wars and present condition. Furthermore, the argument aims to illu-
minate more broadly how these memories can support a bottom-up understanding of 
violent conflicts and the narratives built in their course and aftermath. This article 
does not intend to neglect the importance of mnemonic socialisation, the idea that 
memories are constituted interactionally and that collective frameworks offer ways for 
individual experiences to be rationalised and validated. As Lorraine Ryan aptly 
 summarises, ‘our individual memory inescapably reflects group memory as we incorp-
orate past inexperienced group elements into our own memory and construct our 
individual memories with society’s explanatory tools’ (2010: 157). The article there-
fore accepts the idea that ‘memory is the product of conflicts, power struggles and 
social contestation, always fragile and provisional’ (Bell 2009: 351). 
However, as the case study presented here shows, a sustained encounter with 
 ordinary individual memories of conflict, marginalised by elite discourses and official 
accounts, can challenge the idea of war as a spectacular/exceptional event and move 
our attention to everyday experiences and therefore everyday impacts of violence. 
When we invoke personal memories, we intend to emphasise those narratives that 
have not been sanctioned as authoritative, but also have not been accepted into 
national or even local discourses and maintain the potential to challenge official 
 narratives and public discourses. It is not a matter of negating the interactive and 
1 Interview, North Metn, 27 August 2020.
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shared nature of memory-making, but of shifting the focus onto how memories of 
ordinary individuals, excluded from official scripts and therefore marginal, can 
 challenge the consolidation of hegemonic narratives and reopen the status and inter-
pretation of those collective memories taken as given. The argument developed here 
attempts to show that, whilst memory is always predicated on the interaction between 
private/everyday/individual memories and official/collective ones, this interaction can 
take the form of a dispute, in particular when what is at stake is the legacy of a violent 
conflict. The article also aims to show how individuals’ attachment to their own lived 
experiences (and the memories formed therein) can be a site of contestation of a 
 dominant narrative that negates that lived experience. We focus on the Lebanese Civil 
War (1975–90) as exemplary of a protracted conflict that has a highly fragmented 
(if  at all existent) national memory, dominated by accounts of the ruling political 
class. In this context, the marginal memories discussed above constitute both a site of 
resistance to political and sectarian elites and introduce a different understanding 
of the conflict. 
Lebanon’s post-conflict settlement (formalised in the 1989 Ta’if  Agreement), has 
been to a large extent monopolised by the very political–military actors who fought 
the war. The Amnesty Law from 1991—which has pardoned all crimes against civil-
ians—has promoted a selective amnesia that has reinforced the narratives of specific 
leaders to the detriment of those of ordinary citizens. Political leaders have used 
and continue to use memory to advance their own local and geopolitical agendas and 
interests. As a consequence, the case of Lebanon allows for the study of situations 
where memory discourse becomes an explicit and pivotal tool for the construction 
of political subjectivities. A focus on personal memories underlines the importance of 
power relations in the construction of official narratives and the dissonances, omis-
sions, and assumptions they facilitate. Since the end of the war, leaders and political 
parties have exercised a monopoly over which narratives of the conflict are accepted 
into public discourse. In the absence of a history textbook to explain the Civil War, 
this type of memory work has often been legitimised by State officials and institu-
tions. Artistic productions, such as films and plays that have emphasised the disso-
nance between official and marginal narratives, have been the subject of explicit and 
implicit censorship. Nevertheless, over the years a lively and robust civil society has 
made efforts to challenge this censorship, whilst social media and street protests have 
contributed immensely to breaking the silence. Marginal memories have the potential 
to challenge hegemonic narratives in a country where warlords are still in power and 
instrumentalise the war memory for their own benefit. Sune Haugbolle, for instance, 
writes that political parties actively look for ways
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to inscribe their sectarian hagiographies of martyred leaders and soldiers in national 
history and symbolism. Nevertheless, these sectarian memory cultures, whether in 
East Beirut or in the Dahiya, were essentially defensive and divisive narratives of the 
past that claimed ownership of individual memories on the basis of sectarian identity. 
(2010: 79) 
In Lebanon, memory work is often employed as a tool to nurture and corroborate 
sentiments of fear and resentment within parties’ circles of clients and supporters. One 
could say that in the case of post-war Lebanon officially sanctioned memories are used to 
found the legitimacy of powerful figures who have transitioned from warlord to political 
leader. As Sune Haugbolle and Andres Hastrup note, ‘official renderings of historical 
events frequently sit uneasily with lived experience of the communities and indi viduals 
who have suffered through oppression and violence’ (Haugbolle & Hastrup 2008: 141). 
Bell’s critique that scalar differences should be emphasised as much as similarities is also 
pertinent to our argument, meaning that we should think of individual memories as 
operating in unique ways, rather than just assume that ‘the “collective memories” of 
large groups of people operate in ways analogous to those of small groups, and even 
(in a problematic psychologisation of the political) individual minds’ (2009: 350). 
While much has been written about the Lebanese Civil War, little has been done to 
understand the conflict through its everyday, social and cultural dimensions. Many 
studies have emphasised the role of leaders, local political and sectarian groups, and 
international actors in the war,2 but we know much less about the experiences, views, 
perceptions, and stories of ordinary people during the fifteen years of armed conflict. 
What was it like to live under the protection and authority of a local militia? How do 
2 The bibliography is too vast to be mentioned in full here, but it is worth noting some recent memoirs, 
written both by political–military leaders and members of various militias. For instance: Amine Gemayel 
(2020), Al-Ri’âssat al-Muqâwima, Muzakkarât (A resistant presidential mandate, Memoirs) (Manchourât 
Bayt al-Mustaqbal, Lebanon); Michel Aoun (2017) Ce que je crois; entretiens avec Désirée Sadek 
(Beyrouth, Fondation Michel Aoun); Georges Kassis (2019), Yawmiyât Shahida. Wafâ’ li abtâl al-mou-
qâwamat al-loubnaniya wa amâna lil haqiqa (Witness diaries. In loyalty to the heroes of the Lebanese 
resistance and in honesty to the truth) (Beirut, First volume, Dar Sa’er al-Mashreq); Yussef Bazzi (2007), 
Yasser Arafat m’a regardé et m’a souri (Paris,Verticales Éditions). In addition, a long list of biographies 
on political leaders could be compiled, including the recent: Nada Anid (2014), L’homme de cèdre: les 
trois vies de Samir Geagea (Paris, Calmann-Lévy); Michel Aoun (2007), Une certaine vision du Liban; 
entretiens avec Frédéric Dumont (Paris, Fayard); Igor Timofeev (2000), Kamal Jumblatt: Al-Rajul wa 
al-ustura (Kamal Jumblatt: the man and the legend) (Beirut, Dar An-Nahar); René Naba (1999), Rafic 
Hariri: un homme d’affaires premier ministre (Paris, L’Harmattan). It is also worth mentioning those 
works focusing on the war seen through the lens of political parties and militias, such as the two volumes 
of Alain Ménargues’ (2004) Les secrets de la guerre du Liban (Paris, Albin); Mara Albrecht & Akar 
Bassel (2016), The Power of Remembrance: Political Parties, Memory and Learning About the Past in 
Lebanon (Louaize, Forum ZFD and Center for Applied Research in Education at Notre Dame 
University); and Franck Mermier & Sabrina Mervin (eds) (2012), Leaders et partisans au Liban (Paris, 
Karthala-IFPO; Beyrouth, IISMM).
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they perceive the conflict and its actors today? What have they transmitted to their 
children, grandchildren, and families since the official end of the war? How do they 
believe violent conflicts could be prevented in Lebanon in the present and the future? 
Interrogating ordinary individuals’ memories could offer ways to reinterpret 
 crucial moments of the conflict and revisit assumptions as to the conflict’s dynamics. 
In Lebanon’s case, one of the most resilient narratives is the idea that sectarian  militias 
functioned solely to protect civilians from the same community/religious confession 
in the areas they managed. During the war, many regions were under the control of 
the political and paramilitary factions that had replaced State authorities and some-
times operated in collusion with these. Due to the level of territorial fragmentation 
during the conflict, regions were also referred to as ‘cantons’, in reference to the Swiss 
federations. Political parties and their militias ruled these cantons with the professed 
mission to protect the local population from a threatening ‘enemy’. Leaders often 
used this narrative to legitimise the militia’s existence and mobilise support. This 
 article aims to contribute to challenging these narratives about the past, gathering 
memories of ordinary people that often conflict with hegemonic narratives. 
One of our interviewees, Dolly, 60 years old, recalls how the practice of  kidnapping 
local businessmen and wealthy people to extract ransom was widespread. Dolly, who 
today is the mother of three young adults, says, ‘My father was kidnapped multiple 
times by the local militia. They used to threaten him if he didn’t give them the money they 
asked for.’3 Her sister Ghada, a 61-year-old lawyer, harbours a deep-seated resentment 
towards the militia that abducted her father, but also numerous other people in her 
town, and committed abuses in the very region they were supposed to protect. These 
include imposing illegal taxes, seizing goods and products from stores, and creating a 
kind of ‘arbitration court’ that ‘judged’ people beyond the reach of the State’s 
 judiciary, extorting money and arbitrarily detaining people. Ghada explains that:
militiamen, some of whom we knew from our village, used to invade my father’s store and 
take food or beverage supplies with the excuse that these had expired to re-sell them in 
their so-called cooperative stores or supermarkets. They robbed people, businesses and 
the Beirut port, which was controlled by Christian militias during the war.4 
Ghada’s father Habib who also owned a cinema had to pay a special tax for every 
ticket sold. The militiamen used to attend the movies without paying, but accepted 
they had to leave their weapons outside of the screening room, hanging in the cloak-
room. ‘They were even given a number to identify the “item”’, recalls Joe, 58 years old, 
who was a teenager at the time and used to help his family running the cinema. 
‘I remember that one day militiamen started shooting in the air inside the cinema, to 
3 Interview, North Metn, 24 July 2020.
4 Interview, North Metn, 10 July 2020.
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frighten and intimidate people’, says Fouad, who regularly visited the movie theatre, 
the only one in the region at that time. Fahed, 65 years old, a former employee at the 
cinema, recalls that ‘once the screening of a film was interrupted by a group of armed 
men ordering people from the audience to get out and help filling sandbags for the militia 
in anticipation of a battle’.
What emerges from this study is that civilians within specific communities had to 
suffer various types of abuses and violations from the very same militias that were 
meant to protect them and this also in cases when the militia shared the community’s 
sectarian affiliation. These people have almost never had the opportunity to question 
the formal narratives or to express their views and tell the story of their life during the 
decades of continuous conflicts. This research5 attempts to reverse this reality and 
explores individual narratives in a small town in North Metn, in what was called the 
‘Christian’ or ‘Eastern’6 region as a case study that could support a different under-
standing of the Lebanese conflict, its aftermaths, and the continuous state of turmoil 
and crisis, including the present predicament. The article is divided in three parts: the 
first section looks at the interplay between individual and collective memory; the 
 second section focuses on the case study of a community in North Metn, a district in 
Mount Lebanon, to analyse how individual memories can demand a rewriting of 
national histories and become therefore sites of resistance; the third section broadens 
the scope to highlight how a focus on individual memories shifts our attention onto the 
everyday dimension of conflict. 
Individual and collective memories
Cultural theorists have often been reluctant to accept the significance of individual 
memories or have sought to minimise their value (Green 2004: 41). Partly this is 
because individual memories often challenge the continuity and homogeneity that 
national narratives (in particular those enforced by the nation state) tend to pass off  
as natural. The testimonies collected here form part of a set of memories largely 
5 This article emerges from and shares the aims of the research project ‘Memories from the Margins. 
Bottom-up Practices for Dealing with Conflict-Produced Heritage in Lebanon and Syria’ (https://www.
memoriesmargins.com). 
6 In the opening stages of the war, the capital Beirut was divided between West (with a majority Muslim 
population) and East (majority Christian population) along an imaginary line called ‘demarcation line’ 
or ‘green line’ in reference to the vegetation that had started growing in what had become a no-man’s 
land. This divide was also then applied to the regions situated geographically to the West of Beirut (called 
also ‘Muslim regions’) and to the East of the capital (‘Christian regions’). This divide was symbolic of 
the cleavages between the Lebanese people during the war that resulted in demographic transformation 
due to massive internal displacements.
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repressed and erased from public discourse by official narratives and accounts. It is 
significant that the social movements and protests that have animated Lebanese cities 
since October 2019 have freed the personal narratives related to militia practices and 
their leaders’ behaviour. When people on the streets shouted ‘All of them, means all 
of them’, they aimed their chants precisely at those warlords who stand accused of 
replicating war practices in the time of peace. The rejection of political parties and 
leaders who have played a role during the conflict is indicative of this newly found 
liberation of marginal memories. 
The capacity of individual memories to ‘contest and critique cultural scripts and 
discourses’ (Green: 2004: 42) is an obstacle to their inclusion in both public memory 
and in those analyses that assess its work. As Anna Green suggests, however, ‘oral 
history allows us access to the range of expressive possibilities in a given society’, but 
this implies a broadening of the horizon and requires that ‘we remain open to the 
richness and variety of individual consciousness’ (Green: 2004: 43). 
The influence of the work of Maurice Halbwachs on memory studies is partially 
responsible for this resistance and the omissions this position has produced. As Ryan 
writes, the perception is that Halbwachs’s work produces ‘a complete negation of any 
autonomous individual agency or resistance’ (2010: 155). Halbwachs emphasises the 
‘unity of outlook’, assigning mnemonic agency to the group, which imposes its 
 conventions on the individual remembering subject. Halbwachs ties memories of indi-
viduals tightly to social groups, thus giving weight to the primacy of collective  memory. 
As Emily Keightley and Michael Pickering suggest, ‘in memory studies, too often 
sight is lost of the individuals who engage in acts of remembering’ (2012: 82). 
Following Steve Stern’s work on Pinochet’s Chile (2010), Salwa Ismail in her 
 analysis of memories of the Ba’ath generation in Syria suggests reading the relation 
of public and private as mediated by ‘emblematic frameworks’ (2018: 98). Ismail 
describes these as ‘frames of recollection that enable individuals to make sense of 
their personal experiences and to locate these within remembrances of a collective or 
shared national life’ (98). In this sense, then, interrogating personal narratives is 
important, because these show how ‘personal and intimate everyday life experiences 
aggregate in the life of an individual to form a composite of the national experience’ 
(122). 
Jose Van Dijck’s concept of ‘personal cultural memory’ moves a step further in 
considering personal memories as an autonomous way to negotiate and potentially 
challenge established national and public narratives. As Van Dijck writes, ‘personal 
(re)collections are often subsumed as building blocks of collective history rather than 
being analysed in their own right’ (2007: 2). The idea of personal cultural memory 
seeks to develop a path out of this impasse and Van Dijck defines it as follows: 
‘the acts and products of remembering in which individuals engage to make sense of 
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their lives in relation to the lives of others and their surroundings, situating themselves 
in time and place’ (6). Interestingly, Van Dijck also suggests that ‘aspects of memory 
need to be explained from processes that derive from individual identities’ (9). 
Attending to these processes might also help uncover the expressive nuances of 
 memory, once this becomes narration. Aïda Kanafani-Zahar admirably captures the 
varying speeds of memory, its pauses and abrupt stops, but also its precipitating 
movements, ‘once emerged, a memory possesses a fervor and a liveliness that provokes 
a profound agitation in the speaker’ (2011: 131). Kanafani-Zahar places memory on a 
register of transformations and possibilities: ‘precise, clear, lucid or tumultuous, alter-
nately grave and light […] numb and lively […] it wanders and then recoils’ (2011: 131). 
She finally concludes, ‘memory has a life of its own’ (131), a life that accompanies and 
becomes one with the life of the victim, in particular when this is also memory’s  victim, 
victimised not only by injury, but by official memory’s ignorance and neglect of that 
injury. In this case a personal memory and its testimony is not just a factual story, but 
a way to reconstruct, repair, and regain an identity. Describing the position of the 
individual in Lebanese society in relation to memory and testimony, Kanafani-Zahar 
writes that, whilst ‘the status of the testimony in Lebanese society is that of an “I” 
heavily marked by a communitarian “us”, nonetheless, the narrativization of memory 
channels an individual project’ (133). Our interviews concentrate on the voice of the 
individual, rather than assuming that it matches accepted collective narratives. 
A suburb in North Metn
This study relies on memories of ordinary individuals gathered in a small coastal 
town located in a suburb north of Beirut in North Metn, a district of Mount Lebanon. 
The fieldwork of our research took place in Spring and Summer 2020 and coincided 
with a major political crisis and large-scale protests, an almost unprecedented eco-
nomic and financial crisis, a series of lockdowns imposed to contain the spread of 
Covid 19, and the aforementioned Beirut blast. Testimonies gathered from May to 
September have been inevitably affected by the ongoing situation and the interviewees 
reflected the despair and frustration generated by the current turmoil. To varying 
degrees, all the individuals interviewed have experienced the war and its consequences, 
whether directly or indirectly. 
Interpretations of the series of conflicts that ravaged Lebanon between 1975 and 
1990 vary dramatically in popular, official, and academic renderings. Some argue that 
the war was not Lebanese because regional and international agendas determined its 
onset and course. Others contend that it was based not on civil popular mobilisation 
but on the actions of militias, and others still that it was not one war but a series of 
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wars, each with a different agenda. The conflict came to an end through the so-called 
Ta’if  Agreement signed in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia in September 1989 and approved by the 
Lebanese parliament on 5 November 1989. The agreement describes Lebanon as a 
sovereign, free, and independent country and a final homeland for all its citizens. 
Following the Ta’if  agreement, the amnesty law of 1991 (General Amnesty Law No. 
84/91) granted a general amnesty for crimes perpetrated by all militias and armed 
groups during the years of the Civil War, before 28 March 1991. This general legal 
framework has resulted in a system of impunity that has had a significant impact on 
the post-conflict settlement. As Lyna Comaty recalls, ‘Lebanon’s post-conflict model 
has been diagnosed as having failed at building peace’ and ‘there is neither consensus 
on the causes of the outbreak of the war, nor on the solutions and methods to build 
peace (2019: 3). Samir Khalaf describes Lebanon as ‘adrift’, trapped in a disparaging 
threefold predicament: alienation from the past, anxiety and unease about the present 
and uncertainty about the future’ (2012: 17). Sami Hermez writes that ‘for many in 
Lebanon, the past persists and threatens to continuously fold into the present’ (2017: 
150). Rather than amnesia, Hermez speaks of a ‘structural power to silence people in 
society’ (149). Because of this, ‘civil society was forced to try to redeem these violent 
acts as crimes, as the only and final space for possible closure and hope for account-
ability’ (191). Evoking the work of Kansteiner, Hermez suggests that memory has to 
be a way to confront hegemonic systems of power, ‘rather than think of the work of 
memory in terms of denial and amnesia, we might want to remember Gramsci, and to 
think of the processes being played out as one involving the dominant social order 
trying to assert hegemonic control over history and truth’ (153). Similarly Haugbolle 
writes that ‘Amnesty and amnesia were not just effects of passivity and laissez-faire 
but also conscious policies applied in the name of national reconciliation’ (2010: 71–2).
The dossier of the disappeared and kidnapped deserves particular attention. Despite 
the progress made recently with the establishment of the National Commission for the 
Missing and Forcibly Disappeared Persons (Law 105/2018), whose members were nomi-
nated in June 2020, the fate of the disappeared remains a lens that reveals a whole series 
of obstacles. As Kanafani-Zahar writes, ‘the impasse over the issue of the disappeared 
is intimately linked to the fact that militia leaders have become ministers’ (2011: 90). 
Haugbolle concludes, ‘when there is no echo of (often traumatic) personal war  memories 
to be found in collective memory, the reality of those memories are liable to be put into 
doubt’ (2010: 72–3), therefore entrenching and perpetuating forms of injustice. 
In the case of Lebanon, then, there is a clear antagonism between individual and 
informal, non-official memories and the State’s selective remembering, often 
 intertwined with a political process to shield leaders not only from rival parties/ 
communities, but from the community they are meant to provide for and protect. 
In the absence of a shared national narrative, hegemonic narratives have crystallised 
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around a set of figures: the leader (al-Zaim), the hero (al-Batal) or resistant 
(al- Mouqawim), and the martyr (al-Shahid), leaving little space for the memories of 
ordinary people, including victims. Civilians and their stories in particular have either 
been written out of history or have been co-opted into political narratives. As 
Haugbolle notes, ‘it was common practice for cultural and political elites to appro-
priate the story of the civilian victim and imagine his or her memories. In contrast, his 
or her own voice was seldom heard’ (2010: 137). These counter-hegemonic narratives 
could offer an alternative to the official accounts of the war and offer opportunities to 
understand further the conflict and its legacy, including Lebanon’s present political 
and social crisis. These personal and family memories could be put at the disposal of 
the next generations that could complement or even oppose the formal history 
imposed on the country and its youth. They could contribute to dealing with Lebanon’s 
past and foster social cohesion, truth-seeking, and national reconciliation processes. 
The case study presented here in particular sheds light on the unknown stories of 
ordinary people who not only faced the violence committed by the so-called  ‘foreigner’ 
or ‘stranger’ (al-Gharib) or enemy (al-‘Adu), but also had to confront the burden and 
oppression of local militias who were supposed to protect and defend them. This phe-
nomenon is not unique to this town. However, whilst these practices were all too 
common in many cities and towns in other regions of Lebanon, little research has 
documented them and in particular very few stories have been gathered from the 
affected communities.7 Whilst in a number of cases militias replaced the State’s func-
tions and created infrastructures to provide services, social aid, and healthcare, they 
also committed abuses against members of their own sect or community, and are 
known to have committed human rights violations (including killings and kidnap-
pings), most of which remain undocumented to this day. These abuses and violations 
committed in total impunity were often justified by the militias as ways to maintain 
order in the absence or inaction, and sometimes with the complicity, of regular troops, 
local police, or internal security forces. The wealthiest or at least the well-off  residents, 
shops and business owners and traders, in particular those who were not affiliated to 
these groups, had to pay illegal taxes (Khuwet) and offer pro bono goods and services. 
Whilst some supported these groups with more or less conviction and paid their dues, 
many were forced to contribute to the ‘war effort’, and when they refused to do so 
7 Civil society organisations have made sustained efforts to collect stories as a way of dealing with the past 
from a truth-seeking and truth-telling perspective. For instance, Act for the Disappeared a local NGO 
(non-governmental organisation) launched in 2014 a virtual memorial ‘Fushat ‘Amal’ (space for hope) 
gathering stories of persons missing in war. The International Center for Transitional Justice initiated in 
2012 an oral history project ‘Badna Naaref’ (We Want to Know) to promote intergenerational dialogue 
on the Lebanese war. See also the ICTJ report, How People Talk About the Lebanon Wars. A Study of the 
Perceptions and Expectations of Residents in Greater Beirut (2014).
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were threatened and even physically abused. These practices, which benefited from a 
general lack of accountability, did not disappear with the formal end of the war, but 
were recycled and adopted by the warlords, their followers, and partisans who had by 
then occupied official positions within state institutions. 
In 2019 the protesters of the October Revolution explicitly rejected the political 
class in its entirety. The protests also revealed a profound distrust of institutions, 
which have effectively been occupied by militias that have moved from the battlefield 
to the heart of the state. For the protestors, the violence that the authorities have used 
in response to their demands is the continuation of the Civil War militias’ practices. 
One of the slogans chanted during the protests, ‘We are the popular revolution, You 
are the civil war’, is indicative of this rejection and demonstrates the awakening of 
large parts of the Lebanese to the leaders’ instrumentalisation of fear and threats 
presented by the ‘other’.
The massive participation in the protests of people coming from different regions 
and sects has in a way addressed the legacy of the past and put in place the foundation 
of a true national reconciliation. The parallel between the past oppression and the 
current management of power is therefore striking. The Beirut blast is read by many 
as a direct manifestation of the post-war institutional violence, and culture of  impunity 
that accompanies it. 
The town selected for this research is representative of other localities across the 
country, many of which are still under the direct or indirect influence of these political 
parties, still deploying a diffuse use of violence, with strongmen, ‘security men’, body-
guards at the service of the party’s officials. Dima de Clerck (2012), for instance, 
 discusses the perpetuation of the ‘militarization of Lebanese society’. Since the end of 
the war, thousands of ex-militia fighters and followers were enrolled in the security 
sector or recruited in the civil administration. Fighters were able to pervade the 
 administration and further corrupt it, ‘instead of becoming “civilianised” ’, writes de 
Clerck. This situation makes the investigation more challenging and justifies why most 
of the interviewees expressed the intention to remain anonymous. 
The authors approached a Lebanese family, whose story centres around Habib, 
the patriarch, who during the war ran a food wholesale business and managed a  family 
cinema and theatre. The story of this man told by his family and friends has unlocked 
other stories, individual memories centred around Habib, his shop, his theatre, and his 
town, but also provides insights into the practices of a local militia during the war. 
Two generations were interviewed: the first is the generation who were adults at the 
time of the conflict, mainly parents who had to provide for their children, protect 
them, and try to transmit to them the same values with which they were raised. The 
second generation is composed of their children, who were young children or 
 adolescents at the time of the conflict. The latter consider themselves the ‘generation 
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of the war’, a lost generation who experienced the conflict and its aftermaths with 
bitterness and frustration. The war they knew as children officially ended, but the 
post-war settlement has delivered a country still mired in unrest. 
The study uses semi-structured interviews with individuals, allowing further 
 interventions and comments from their family members who could be present during 
the discussion. We noticed that conducting the interview in the presence of the  family’s 
members is of great interest, as those who witnessed the war participate in the discus-
sions, giving their version of the story, reminding the main interviewee of details and 
events they could have forgotten. The discussions trigger stories and emotions that 
become an opportunity for family members, old and young, to talk about forgotten or 
untold memories. The individual interview could transform into a group meeting, 
with debates reflecting on incidents, people, and special moments: both the agreeable 
and the disagreeable, the sad and hurtful events. These discussions between family 
members have truth-telling and truth-seeking effects on the audience, particularly on 
the youngest (grandchildren), who were born after the end of the war. In many 
Lebanese families talking about the war is still an uncomfortable exercise or even 
taboo, so these intergenerational dialogues triggered by the interviews are likely to 
have lasting impacts on all members. One man’s story facilitated the appearance of 
multiple individual narratives in a snowball effect. Each interviewee guided the 
authors to another participant who would complement their narrative, adding 
 information and data in a complex puzzle.
Dolly cannot forget what her father Habib went through during the war to meet 
the local militia’s demands: 
he disappeared multiple times, he didn’t come back from work at night and my mother 
used to receive calls that he was only visiting them. She had to write cheques to get him 
back. For them, even though he was in debt, the bank could give him loans. He used to 
work hard so they knew he had cash. They hurt my father a lot.8 
He was continuously forced by the local militia to make financial contributions. When 
he was unable to do so or refused to, he was invited for a ‘coffee’ or a ‘chat’ at the 
party’s regional headquarters. If  he did not understand the message of these calls and 
visits, he was kidnapped and detained in the headquarters offices or in a container 
until his wife, Angele, delivered a cheque. Angele, 84 years old, still finds it difficult 
to discuss what happened to her husband, her fears for his safety and how she had to 
collect the money and write a cheque to save Habib’s life. 
8 Interview, North Metn, 24 July 2020.
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They used to kidnap him saying that he is their ‘guest’ until I handed them the money. 
The worst was that the party’s partisans who detained my husband were people from the 
village and one of them was even a relative, 
she recalls.9 This happened many times and the family had to wait anxiously for him 
to return home safely. The local militia used to visit every store and every house to 
collect money on a monthly basis. Ghada recalls how her friend Dania received the 
visit of the militia’s ‘money collector’ on the day when people were visiting her house 
to offer condolences for her recently deceased mother. 
He stood at the door waiting to collect them money, while people were there paying 
respect to the dead woman. My friend refused to pay him. The contributions my father 
paid to the militia have been noted in the store’s accounting books. I still have these and 
copies of checks we paid.10 
Fouad, 67 years old, remembers how he had to accompany his father to the  militia’s 
HQ to pay a ‘visit’ and how he had to wait for him in the car hoping he would return 
safe and sound. ‘I once took my father there. Their main headquarters in North Metn. 
I waited there for him. When he came back, he said nothing at all.’11 The memory of the 
humiliation and despair his father and his family experienced for years until his death 
in 1982 is still vivid and Fouad holds the militia responsible for his father’s early death, 
‘he could have lived longer if the militia didn’t make his life impossible’. Dolly and her 
family still bear a grudge against the political party and its leaders thirty years after 
the end of the hostilities. ‘How can our children and grandchildren forget or forgive 
those who are responsible for their grandfather’s kidnapping, bankruptcy or death?’, 
wonders Ghada, who blames the continuous kidnappings by the local militia for her 
father’s dementia and early death.12 Habib’s family have transmitted to the younger 
generation their resentment towards the militia. This is today a very influential polit-
ical party in the North Metn region and considers itself  currently as an ‘opposition 
party’ with a clean record fighting the State’s corruption and calling for accountabil-
ity. The parents make sure that their children are aware of the party’s legacy of abuses 
and violations. This heritage is of course neither limited to the North Metn region, 
nor to this particular militia; it is present in many families and communities across 
Lebanon. Since October 2019, young people have expressed in street protests and on 
social media their distrust of the current ruling class, drawing the parallel between 
their war practices and the mismanagement, wrongdoings, and policies of the past 
thirty years.
9 Interview, North Metn, 5 July 2020.
10 Interview, North Metn, 10 July 2020.
11 Interview, North Metn,10 July 2020.
12 Interview, North Metn, 10 July 2020.
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Testimonies such as the ones presented here can be read in terms of the  ‘subjugated 
knowledges’ and ‘counter-memories’ discussed by Michel Foucault (2003: 7). Foucault 
offers a twofold definition of subjugated knowledges: ‘historical contents that have 
been buried’ and ‘naive knowledges’, ‘knowledges from below’ (7). It is the reappear-
ance of this differential knowledge (8) that makes critique possible. As José Medina 
writes, ‘Foucault places practices of remembering and forgetting in the context of 
power relations in such a way that possibilities of resistance and subversion are 
brought to the fore’ (2011: 10). Drawing on Foucault’s work, Medina further suggests 
that memories could challenge coercive epistemic frameworks and that therefore it is 
crucial to mobilise those whose memories do not fit existing historical narratives, 
‘scattered, marginalized publics, tapping into the critical potential of dejected experi-
ences and memories’ (11). Where official histories ‘create and maintain the unity and 
continuity of a political body’ (14), counter-histories try to challenge and interrupt 
this continuity. 
Three major events were mentioned during the interviews as having had the 
 greatest impact on this North Metn town and its residents. The first took place in 1975 
during the early stages of the war, when local militias fought for the control of the 
town resulting in its first victims and wounded. The second event happened a few 
months later. Fouad, a medical student at the time of the incident, recounts how a 
delegation representing the town had visited the leader of the main militia in the 
region to ask for help to get rid of a rival political party whose behaviour had become 
intolerable to many. To deploy its forces the leader asked for a large sum of money 
that the town could not afford.13 The delegation decided then to create an independent 
group that would guarantee the safety of the town. The militia leader was not happy 
with this decision and a few days later his militia killed four young men, associated with 
the independent group formed to defend the town. To claim the assassinations 
and assert their power, the militiamen rushed to hang their leader’s poster over a 
building that the independent group used as headquarters. For Ghada, who was 16 at 
the time, it was the first encounter with the war. She helped transport the killed and the 
wounded to the city’s hospital with a group of friends. She recalls the story without 
hiding her emotion: ‘I still remember that day, the boys lying on the ground  drowning in 
their blood and how we rushed to the nearby hospital. We knew them all.’14 The third 
event took place on 17 August 1985 with the explosion of a 250-kilogram hexogen 
bomb placed in front of a busy supermarket, resulting in the killing of 32 people with 
85 wounded.15 Many in the area suspected the bombing to be the work of the local 
13 Interview, North Metn, 10 July 2020.
14 Interview, North Metn, 10 July 2020.
15 AnNahar (Lebanese newspaper), 18 and 19 August 1985. Cited by ICTJ (2013).
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militia in its struggle for power in the region. Fouad says: ‘I think it was them, because 
all that was being done to Habib [his father-in-law] was done to many in the region, 
including to the owner of this supermarket chain. I think he had stopped paying, he was 
fed up.’16 Thirty-five years later, the families of the victims refuse to forget, and the 
younger generation bears the trauma of the crimes committed against their relatives 
and town. Nothing has been done to address the legacy of abuses committed by the 
militias that were in principle committed to protecting the local population. It is sig-
nificant that, in the elections that have taken place in the past three decades, the town’s 
voters have always avoided voting for the candidates representing the old militia and 
political party. It is their way of expressing their bitterness and in a way addressing the 
war’s heritage. 
The testimonies and stories gathered here signal to something true of Lebanon’s 
Civil War, but applicable to a broader context. In the context of changing memory 
cultures in the Middle East, Haugbolle writes that, whilst the national sphere is often 
still saturated with state-enforced rhetoric, ‘increased access to information, means of 
expression and political participation are introducing previously “intimate” views 
of the past into public deliberation, thereby challenging state-centred narratives of 
national memory’ (Haugbolle & Hastrup 2008: 137). In most cases the state’s control 
relegates disruptive memories to the margins of public discourse and erects homoge-
neous accounts as walls against potential attacks. However, as Achille Mbembe writes, 
every archive, ‘is at once a breaching (frayage), an opening, and a separation, a fissure 
and a breaking, a crazing and a disjunction [...] no archive exists without its cracks 
(lézardes). One enters into it as though through a narrow door, with the hope of 
 penetrating in depth the thickness of the event and its cavities’ (2019: 172). Memory 
therefore becomes one of the tools that artists and activists alike can use to revisit and 
renew ‘the rich legacy of contentious politics and radicalism’ (Haugbolle 2019: 287). 
War, experience, and the everyday
It is precisely from these margins that subversive memories can begin to exploit the 
cracks in the archive of national memory. In a similar way and notwithstanding its 
limited scope, this study also shows that attending to personal memories offers import-
ant elements for a study of war as a set of experiences felt in the everyday. Personal 
memories, normally marginalised in global politics, but also in historiographies 
 dedicated to armed conflicts, reveal war as an experiential continuum. As feminist 
scholarship has emphasised, ‘war is a social activity of collective violence around 
16 Interview, North Metn, 10 July 2020.
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which a wide variety of bodily experiences are created, altered, and can themselves 
create or constitute war’ (Sylvester 2013: 65). This approach allows for a renewed look 
at conflict and, as Christine Sylvester suggests, can ‘jog the mind into a different 
 quadrant of knowing and understanding’ (2010: 123). 
Thinking about conflict as experienced means bringing to the fore elements of war 
that are traditionally excluded, looking for deeper ways in which war reaches into 
society, means understanding conflict not as a discrete event, but as a continuum, 
therefore starting earlier and going on for longer and populated by a wider variety of 
actors and means. It also means abandoning the idea that we can always fashion a 
coherent narrative, but that we have to acknowledge the complex and pervasive (every-
day) nature of conflict. As Laura Sjoberg writes: ‘starting with the lives of people, 
gives us not just a different method of studying war, but a different view of war, one 
which draws our attention away from national interest politics to the individual that 
touches and is touched by war physically and emotionally’ (2013: 253). 
To study war as experience requires, therefore, that the human body come into 
focus as a unit that has agency in war and is also the target of war’s violence. It also 
means introducing and doing justice to the affective elements of armed conflict. The 
study of individual memories can contribute profoundly to reorienting our under-
standing of war, showing, for instance, how militarisation occupies everyday life and 
opening up that ‘different realm of thinking’ (271) alluded to by Sjoberg. 
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